Phase 0's API half: a working FastAPI app with register/login/me/logout, backed by a Postgres schema where row-level security is real and independently proven, not just declared. The core design decision, and the reason this lands as one PR instead of several: request-scoped queries run as `velodrome_app` (NOBYPASSRLS), but looking up identity in the first place — login by email, a session by its token hash — has to happen *before* app.user_id can be set, so those specific lookups run as a second role, `velodrome_auth` (BYPASSRLS), used nowhere else in the codebase. See velodrome/db.py's module docstring and apps/api/README.md for the full rationale. This is genuinely one reviewable unit: the migration, the models, and the auth service only make sense evaluated together, since they're three views of the same invariant. tests/test_auth.py::test_rls_blocks_cross_user_session_reads is the test worth reading first — it doesn't trust the RLS policy SQL because it reads correctly, it proves isolation by registering two users and confirming a scoped read of `sessions` for user A returns exactly one row, never two. Bugs found and fixed while actually running this against real Postgres (everything below was verified against a live postgis/postgis:16-3.4 container and a built Docker image, not just read for correctness): - CREATE ROLE's PASSWORD clause is DDL, not DML — it doesn't accept bind parameters (`PASSWORD $1` is a syntax error). Fixed with dollar-quoting. - Postgres roles are cluster-wide, not per-database — a second database in the same cluster hit "role already exists" on a plain CREATE ROLE. Fixed with a DO block catching duplicate_object. - A bare `Mapped[datetime]` on the ORM models infers a naive timestamp, silently disagreeing with the migration's correct `DateTime(timezone=True)` — asyncpg rejected the mismatch at insert time. Fixed once, at the declarative Base level via type_annotation_map, rather than per-column. - The session cookie's `secure` flag was gated on `!= "development"`, so anything else — including local testing and a real deploy running temporarily without TLS in front — got a Secure cookie no HTTP client will ever send back, breaking every authenticated request after login with no visible error. Gated on `== "production"` instead. - `alembic check` initially flagged every PostGIS/TIGER-installed table (dozens of them) as drift, because they're not in our metadata. A schema-based denylist doesn't work — reflected foreign tables come back with schema=None regardless of their real schema. Fixed with an allowlist keyed on target_metadata.tables instead, which is also more robust against future PostGIS versions adding more tables. - The migration itself was missing `nullable=False` on three timestamp columns that the ORM model assumed were never null — a genuine model/migration drift that alembic check caught once the PostGIS noise above was filtered out. Fixed in 0001 directly, since it's never shipped. - Two indexes the migration creates explicitly weren't declared on the ORM models, causing the same kind of drift. Added index=True to match. Deliberately deferred, not forgotten: per-IP/per-account login rate limiting (docs/PLAN.md mentions it; Phase 0's bar is a working skeleton, and this needs its own design pass) and the procrastinate job runner / worker container (nothing to run yet — arrives with the ingestion pipeline). ci.yml updated to match: the api and migrations jobs now provision the same two runtime roles this code actually needs, replacing the single placeholder DATABASE_URL from before any code existed. Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy --strict all clean. 12/12 pytest passing against a real Postgres. Full alembic upgrade -> downgrade -1 -> upgrade cycle run twice (once standalone, once inside a two-database cluster to specifically catch the role-collision bug). alembic check clean. Docker image builds and serves real traffic — register and an authenticated GET /me both exercised against the actual built container, not just the test suite. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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apps/api
Python 3.12 / FastAPI / SQLAlchemy 2.0 async / Alembic. See docs/PLAN.md for the overall
design and docs/DECISIONS.md for why things are built this way.
Layout
velodrome/
app.py FastAPI app factory
config.py Settings (env-driven, see below)
db.py Two database engines — read this first, it's the load-bearing module
ids.py UUIDv7 generation
models/ SQLAlchemy models
auth/ Password hashing, session service, FastAPI auth dependencies
api/v1/ Route handlers
schemas/ Pydantic request/response models
alembic/ Migrations. 0001_baseline.py creates the identity tables, the two
runtime DB roles, and their RLS policies — read its module docstring.
tests/ pytest, against a real Postgres, never mocked
Why two database connections
The app connects to Postgres as two different roles, not one — this is the single most
important thing to understand before touching auth/ or db.py:
velodrome_app—NOBYPASSRLS. Every request that already knows who's calling uses this, viadb.scoped_session(user_id), which setsapp.user_idfor the transaction so Postgres RLS policies can key off it.velodrome_auth—BYPASSRLS. Used only byauth/service.py, and only for the narrow set of lookups that must happen before identity is known: login by email, a session by its token hash, an invite by its code hash — plus the inserts that create those rows. Every one of those queries is an exact match on a unique key, never an unfiltered scan, which is what makes bypassing RLS safe there.
A third connection — VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE — is used only by Alembic. It needs enough
privilege to CREATE ROLE and GRANT, so in practice it's the Postgres superuser (or a
schema-owning role); the app itself never connects with it.
If you're adding a new table with per-user data: give it a user_id column, enable RLS on it in
a migration, and query it only through scoped_session. See CLAUDE.md's invariants.
Environment variables
| Variable | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE |
Alembic only | Superuser/owner DSN. Never used by the app itself. |
VELODROME_DB_APP_PASSWORD |
Alembic (creates the role) | No default — the migration fails loudly if unset. |
VELODROME_DB_AUTH_PASSWORD |
Alembic (creates the role) | Same. |
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_APP |
The app | Connects as velodrome_app. |
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_AUTH |
The app | Connects as velodrome_auth. |
VELODROME_SECRET_KEY |
The app | Not yet used (arrives with the Bryton credential encryption in a later phase); declared now so the settings shape is stable. |
VELODROME_ENVIRONMENT |
The app | development / test / production. Gates the session cookie's Secure flag — see the comment in api/v1/auth.py before changing this condition. |
VELODROME_PUBLIC_URL |
The app | Used for the CSRF Origin check on cookie-authenticated mutations. |
Running locally
uv sync --all-extras
# a throwaway Postgres
docker run -d --name velodrome-dev-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=velodrome \
-p 5432:5432 postgis/postgis:16-3.4
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE=postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/velodrome
export VELODROME_DB_APP_PASSWORD=devpassword1
export VELODROME_DB_AUTH_PASSWORD=devpassword2
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_APP=postgresql+asyncpg://velodrome_app:devpassword1@localhost:5432/velodrome
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_AUTH=postgresql+asyncpg://velodrome_auth:devpassword2@localhost:5432/velodrome
uv run alembic upgrade head
uv run uvicorn velodrome.app:app --reload
GET /api/v1/healthz should return {"status": "ok"}; GET /api/v1/docs has interactive
Swagger UI outside production.
Testing
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy --strict velodrome
uv run pytest
Tests run against a real Postgres (a service container in CI, or point tests/conftest.py's
defaults at your own) — never mocks for DB behaviour, per CLAUDE.md. The test suite runs the real
Alembic migration at session start, not a parallel schema-creation shortcut, so it's exercising
the exact same path a real deploy uses.
The test worth reading if you're new to this codebase is
tests/test_auth.py::test_rls_blocks_cross_user_session_reads — it doesn't trust that the RLS
policy SQL is correct because it reads correctly; it proves it by actually trying to read another
user's row through the scoped role and asserting zero come back.
A note on alembic check
CI's migrations job runs alembic check to catch drift between the ORM models and the actual
migrations. alembic/env.py's include_object filter restricts that comparison to tables our own
metadata declares — deliberately an allowlist, not a denylist of PostGIS/TIGER tables, because
reflected foreign tables can come back with schema=None regardless of which schema they actually
live in (confirmed against a real postgis/postgis:16-3.4 container), which makes a schema-based
denylist unreliable. If you add a new model, it's automatically covered — no filter to update.