Reverses a shipped, tested, merged decision (D4/PR #2) rather than building on it — see docs/DECISIONS.md D15 for the full record: what was rejected (Postgres as a second container; Postgres+PostGIS bundled inside the single container via a supervisor), what this costs (no database-level RLS, no PostGIS, procrastinate needs replacing — all stated as a concern before this was decided, and reaffirmed anyway, which is the user's call to make about their own instance). The one invariant-critical consequence: isolation between users now rests entirely on the repository-layer scope (db.py's `Scope.select()`), not two layers. CLAUDE.md's invariant #4 is revised accordingly. This is not a downgrade-and-hope — `Scope` is built so an unfiltered query against a user-owned table is structurally harder to write than a scoped one (there is no method on `Scope` that returns one), and tests/test_auth.py::test_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_reads replaces the old RLS proof with the same empirical standard: it doesn't trust the query builder filters correctly because the code reads correctly, it registers two real users and checks. test_unscoped_session_can_see_every_user_when_misused is the deliberately alarming companion — it demonstrates exactly what a reviewer must now catch, since nothing else will. Six real, non-obvious SQLite behaviours found and fixed by actually running this against a real file, not assumed from docs: - Foreign keys, ON DELETE CASCADE included, are OFF by default per connection — deleting a user silently left orphaned sessions/api_tokens, no error either way. Fixed with PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON on every connect. - Transactions default to DEFERRED, which only takes a write lock on the first actual write — a real check-then-act race for invite redemption (two concurrent redemptions could both read used_count < max_uses as true before either commits). Fixed by disabling the driver's implicit BEGIN and issuing BEGIN IMMEDIATE ourselves — SQLAlchemy's own documented recipe for this, not improvised. - DateTime(timezone=True) does NOT round-trip tzinfo on SQLite — a tz-aware datetime goes in, a naive one comes back out, and every `expires_at < datetime.now(UTC)` comparison in auth/service.py then raises TypeError. Fixed once at the Base level with a UTCDateTime TypeDecorator rather than per-column. - Uuid(as_uuid=True) stores as 32-char hex with NO hyphens on SQLite, not str(uuid)'s hyphenated form. A test fixture that raw-inserted the hyphenated form left rows the ORM's own later UPDATE (via invite.used_count += 1's autoflush) could never match by primary key, updating zero rows and raising StaleDataError. Fixed by using .hex to match exactly what the ORM itself writes. - BEGIN IMMEDIATE applies to every transaction, reads included — a long-lived test fixture that autobegins a transaction via a bare read and never explicitly closes it holds SQLite's exclusive write lock for the rest of the test, and a later scoped_session() call fails with "database is locked". Not an app-code bug (every real session block closes cleanly on exit), but real enough to document since the next person writing a test against the db_auth fixture will hit it too. - Python's sqlite3 module deprecates its own implicit datetime adapter as of 3.12 — silent today, warns on every raw-SQL datetime bind. Only ever hit test fixture code (the ORM path never uses it, confirmed by running the ORM-only health test with warnings promoted to errors and it stayed clean); fixed there with an explicit .isoformat() rather than left for a future Python version to turn into a real failure. Also, since with_for_update() silently no-ops on SQLite (confirmed — SQLAlchemy emits no SQL for it, no error either) rather than actually locking anything: removed it from register()'s invite-redemption query and corrected the comment to attribute the concurrency guarantee to BEGIN IMMEDIATE, where it now actually lives. One PR, not several, for the same reason PR #2 was: the migration, the models, db.py, and the docs recording why are five views of one decision — splitting them wouldn't make review easier, just disconnected. 552 insertions / 548 deletions across 17 files, most of it necessarily touching what PR #2 shipped rather than net-new code. Deliberately deferred, not solved here: PostGIS's replacement for spatial storage, procrastinate's replacement for background jobs, and the EXCLUDE USING gist constraint's replacement for component_installs — none of those tables exist yet (Phase 1-2), so none of it is broken, and docs/DECISIONS.md D15 records exactly what each future phase needs to decide before it can be built. .gitea/workflows/deploy pipeline (PR #4, built for the old 3-container Postgres compose stack) was closed as superseded rather than merged; the single-container image build is follow-up work, not part of this change. Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy --strict all clean. 13/13 pytest passing against a real SQLite file, including with DeprecationWarning promoted to an error (confirms the sqlite3 adapter deprecation fix actually holds, not just that it's quiet by default). Full alembic upgrade -> downgrade -1 -> upgrade cycle run clean. alembic check clean with no include_object filter needed at all now (SQLite starts with nothing but what our own migrations create — no PostGIS/TIGER noise to filter out in the first place). CI's exact migration command sequence reproduced locally end to end before touching the workflow file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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apps/api
Python 3.12 / FastAPI / SQLAlchemy 2.0 async / Alembic / SQLite. See docs/PLAN.md for the
overall design and docs/DECISIONS.md (D15 especially) for why the database is SQLite and not
the Postgres+PostGIS setup Phase 0 originally shipped with.
Layout
velodrome/
app.py FastAPI app factory
config.py Settings (env-driven, see below)
db.py Single engine + the repository-layer scope — read this first, it's the
load-bearing module for user isolation now that there's no RLS
ids.py UUIDv7 generation
models/ SQLAlchemy models
auth/ Password hashing, session service, FastAPI auth dependencies
api/v1/ Route handlers
schemas/ Pydantic request/response models
alembic/ Migrations. 0001_baseline.py creates the identity tables — no roles, no
RLS, no GRANTs, none of those concepts exist in SQLite.
tests/ pytest, against a real SQLite file, never mocked
Why isolation is enforced in Python now, not the database
Phase 0 originally ran two Postgres roles (velodrome_app/velodrome_auth) with row-level
security as a database-enforced isolation layer. SQLite has no roles, no session variables, and no
policy engine — there is no database-level backstop anymore. This is the single most important
thing to understand before touching auth/ or db.py:
scoped_session(user_id)— for every query against a user-owned table once identity is known. Yields aScope, whoseselect()is the only way to build a query through it, and every query it builds is pre-filtered to thatuser_idon any model that declares one. There is no method onScopethat returns an unfiltered query — seetests/test_auth.py'stest_scope_select_rejects_models_without_user_idfor what happens if you try it on a model that isn't user-owned (Invite, scoped bycreated_byrather thanuser_id, is the real example used there).auth_session()— used only byauth/service.py, for the narrow set of lookups that must happen before identity is known: login by email, a session by its token hash, an invite by its code hash, plus the inserts that create those rows. Every one of those queries is an exact match on a unique key, never an unfiltered scan — that discipline is what makes it safe to use a plain session here instead ofScope.unscoped_session()— a plain session with no scoping applied at all, for health checks and anything that never touches a user-owned table.tests/test_auth.py'stest_unscoped_session_can_see_every_user_when_misuseddemonstrates, deliberately, what happens if this gets used on a user-owned table instead ofscoped_session— it sees everyone's rows. That test exists to make the point vivid: reaching forunscoped_session()(or a rawauth_session()query) against a user-owned table is a review-blocking mistake now, not a style preference, because there's nothing else standing behind it.
If you're adding a new table with per-user data: give it a user_id column and query it only
through scoped_session. See CLAUDE.md's invariant #4.
Two SQLite behaviours that don't match the defaults you'd expect
Both confirmed empirically against real aiosqlite, not assumed from docs — see db.py's
_configure_sqlite_for_concurrent_writers for the fixes:
- Foreign keys,
ON DELETE CASCADEincluded, are OFF by default per connection. WithoutPRAGMA foreign_keys=ON, deleting a user silently leaves its sessions/api_tokens behind instead of cascading — no error either way. - Transactions default to DEFERRED, which only takes a write lock on the first actual write —
leaving a real check-then-act race window (e.g. two concurrent redemptions of the same invite
code both reading
used_count < max_usesas true before either commits). Every transaction on this engine issuesBEGIN IMMEDIATEinstead, which takes the write lock up front. One consequence worth knowing if you're writing tests: a session that autobegins a transaction via a bare read and never explicitly commits/rolls back holds that write lock until the session closes — see the comment aboveawait db_auth.commit()intest_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_readsfor a real example of this biting a long-lived test fixture.
Also worth knowing: Uuid(as_uuid=True) stores as 32-char hex with no hyphens on SQLite, not
str(uuid)'s hyphenated form. This only matters if you ever write a UUID into this schema via raw
SQL instead of the ORM (as the test fixtures do, to set up state without going through the API) —
use .hex, not str(), or the ORM's own later queries against that row won't match it. See the
docstring on _seed_invite in tests/test_auth.py for the failure this caused when it was
gotten wrong.
Environment variables
| Variable | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL |
The app and Alembic, both | e.g. sqlite+aiosqlite:////data/velodrome.db. One DSN — there's no separate migration role anymore since SQLite has no roles to separate. |
VELODROME_SECRET_KEY |
The app | Not yet used (arrives with the Bryton credential encryption in a later phase); declared now so the settings shape is stable. |
VELODROME_ENVIRONMENT |
The app | development / test / production. Gates the session cookie's Secure flag — see the comment in api/v1/auth.py before changing this condition. |
VELODROME_PUBLIC_URL |
The app | Used for the CSRF Origin check on cookie-authenticated mutations. |
Running locally
uv sync --all-extras
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL=sqlite+aiosqlite:///./velodrome-dev.db
uv run alembic upgrade head
uv run uvicorn velodrome.app:app --reload
GET /api/v1/healthz should return {"status": "ok"}; GET /api/v1/docs has interactive
Swagger UI outside production.
Testing
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy --strict velodrome
uv run pytest
Tests run against a real SQLite file in a temp directory (never :memory:, which gives each
separate connection its own isolated database rather than one shared one, and never mocks for DB
behaviour, per CLAUDE.md). The suite runs the real Alembic migration at session start, not a
parallel schema-creation shortcut, so it's exercising the exact same path a real deploy uses.
The test worth reading first if you're new to this codebase is
tests/test_auth.py::test_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_reads — it doesn't trust that
Scope.select() filters correctly because the code reads correctly; it proves it by registering
two real users and confirming a scoped read for one never returns the other's row, even though
both exist in the same table.
A note on alembic check
CI's migrations job runs alembic check to catch drift between the ORM models and the actual
migrations. There's no include_object filter in alembic/env.py anymore — Phase 0's version
needed one to exclude PostGIS/TIGER's own pre-installed tables from the comparison, but SQLite
starts with nothing but what this app's own migrations create, so there's no foreign-table noise
to filter out in the first place.