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bike-app/apps/api/velodrome/auth/service.py
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BBergleandClaude Opus 5 e7392a5723
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refactor(api): move from Postgres+RLS to single-engine SQLite
Reverses a shipped, tested, merged decision (D4/PR #2) rather than building
on it — see docs/DECISIONS.md D15 for the full record: what was rejected
(Postgres as a second container; Postgres+PostGIS bundled inside the single
container via a supervisor), what this costs (no database-level RLS, no
PostGIS, procrastinate needs replacing — all stated as a concern before this
was decided, and reaffirmed anyway, which is the user's call to make about
their own instance).

The one invariant-critical consequence: isolation between users now rests
entirely on the repository-layer scope (db.py's `Scope.select()`), not two
layers. CLAUDE.md's invariant #4 is revised accordingly. This is not a
downgrade-and-hope — `Scope` is built so an unfiltered query against a
user-owned table is structurally harder to write than a scoped one (there is
no method on `Scope` that returns one), and
tests/test_auth.py::test_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_reads replaces the
old RLS proof with the same empirical standard: it doesn't trust the query
builder filters correctly because the code reads correctly, it registers two
real users and checks.
test_unscoped_session_can_see_every_user_when_misused is the deliberately
alarming companion — it demonstrates exactly what a reviewer must now catch,
since nothing else will.

Six real, non-obvious SQLite behaviours found and fixed by actually running
this against a real file, not assumed from docs:

- Foreign keys, ON DELETE CASCADE included, are OFF by default per
  connection — deleting a user silently left orphaned sessions/api_tokens,
  no error either way. Fixed with PRAGMA foreign_keys=ON on every connect.
- Transactions default to DEFERRED, which only takes a write lock on the
  first actual write — a real check-then-act race for invite redemption
  (two concurrent redemptions could both read used_count < max_uses as true
  before either commits). Fixed by disabling the driver's implicit BEGIN and
  issuing BEGIN IMMEDIATE ourselves — SQLAlchemy's own documented recipe for
  this, not improvised.
- DateTime(timezone=True) does NOT round-trip tzinfo on SQLite — a tz-aware
  datetime goes in, a naive one comes back out, and every
  `expires_at < datetime.now(UTC)` comparison in auth/service.py then raises
  TypeError. Fixed once at the Base level with a UTCDateTime TypeDecorator
  rather than per-column.
- Uuid(as_uuid=True) stores as 32-char hex with NO hyphens on SQLite, not
  str(uuid)'s hyphenated form. A test fixture that raw-inserted the
  hyphenated form left rows the ORM's own later UPDATE (via
  invite.used_count += 1's autoflush) could never match by primary key,
  updating zero rows and raising StaleDataError. Fixed by using .hex to
  match exactly what the ORM itself writes.
- BEGIN IMMEDIATE applies to every transaction, reads included — a
  long-lived test fixture that autobegins a transaction via a bare read and
  never explicitly closes it holds SQLite's exclusive write lock for the
  rest of the test, and a later scoped_session() call fails with "database
  is locked". Not an app-code bug (every real session block closes cleanly
  on exit), but real enough to document since the next person writing a
  test against the db_auth fixture will hit it too.
- Python's sqlite3 module deprecates its own implicit datetime adapter as of
  3.12 — silent today, warns on every raw-SQL datetime bind. Only ever hit
  test fixture code (the ORM path never uses it, confirmed by running the
  ORM-only health test with warnings promoted to errors and it stayed
  clean); fixed there with an explicit .isoformat() rather than left for a
  future Python version to turn into a real failure.

Also, since with_for_update() silently no-ops on SQLite (confirmed —
SQLAlchemy emits no SQL for it, no error either) rather than actually
locking anything: removed it from register()'s invite-redemption query and
corrected the comment to attribute the concurrency guarantee to BEGIN
IMMEDIATE, where it now actually lives.

One PR, not several, for the same reason PR #2 was: the migration, the
models, db.py, and the docs recording why are five views of one decision —
splitting them wouldn't make review easier, just disconnected. 552
insertions / 548 deletions across 17 files, most of it necessarily touching
what PR #2 shipped rather than net-new code.

Deliberately deferred, not solved here: PostGIS's replacement for spatial
storage, procrastinate's replacement for background jobs, and the
EXCLUDE USING gist constraint's replacement for component_installs — none
of those tables exist yet (Phase 1-2), so none of it is broken, and
docs/DECISIONS.md D15 records exactly what each future phase needs to
decide before it can be built. .gitea/workflows/deploy pipeline (PR #4,
built for the old 3-container Postgres compose stack) was closed as
superseded rather than merged; the single-container image build is
follow-up work, not part of this change.

Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy --strict all clean.
13/13 pytest passing against a real SQLite file, including with
DeprecationWarning promoted to an error (confirms the sqlite3 adapter
deprecation fix actually holds, not just that it's quiet by default). Full
alembic upgrade -> downgrade -1 -> upgrade cycle run clean. alembic check
clean with no include_object filter needed at all now (SQLite starts with
nothing but what our own migrations create — no PostGIS/TIGER noise to
filter out in the first place). CI's exact migration command sequence
reproduced locally end to end before touching the workflow file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 15:42:44 -04:00

200 lines
7.5 KiB
Python

"""Auth bootstrap logic: register, login, session validation, logout.
Every function here runs against `db.auth_session()` (see its docstring for why these specific
pre-identity lookups need it) and every query is an exact match on a unique key — email,
token_hash, or code_hash — never an unfiltered scan.
Nothing outside this module should import `db.auth_session` — if a new feature needs it, that's
a sign the feature belongs here, not that the import should spread.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from uuid import UUID
from sqlalchemy import select, update
from velodrome.auth.security import (
generate_token,
hash_invite_code,
hash_password,
hash_token,
verify_password,
)
from velodrome.config import get_settings
from velodrome.db import auth_session
from velodrome.models import Invite, Session, User
class AuthError(Exception):
"""Base class for auth failures the API layer turns into 4xx responses."""
class InvalidCredentials(AuthError):
pass
class InvalidInvite(AuthError):
pass
class EmailAlreadyRegistered(AuthError):
pass
class SessionInvalid(AuthError):
pass
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthenticatedSession:
user_id: UUID
email: str
display_name: str
async def register(
*, email: str, password: str, display_name: str, invite_code: str
) -> AuthenticatedSession:
"""Validate an invite and create a user, atomically.
Open signup does not exist — see docs/PLAN.md "Auth". What stops a shared invite link being
redeemed twice concurrently is db.py's `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` setup, not a row lock on this
SELECT — SQLite has no `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` (SQLAlchemy's SQLite dialect silently no-ops
`.with_for_update()`, confirmed empirically; it used to appear here when this ran against
Postgres — see git history). `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` takes SQLite's write lock for the whole
transaction up front, so two concurrent redemptions can't both read `used_count < max_uses`
as true before either commits — the second one simply waits for the first transaction to
finish, then sees the incremented count.
"""
code_hash = hash_invite_code(invite_code)
async with auth_session() as db:
async with db.begin():
invite = (
await db.execute(select(Invite).where(Invite.code_hash == code_hash))
).scalar_one_or_none()
if invite is None:
raise InvalidInvite("invite code not found")
if invite.revoked_at is not None:
raise InvalidInvite("invite has been revoked")
if invite.expires_at < datetime.now(UTC):
raise InvalidInvite("invite has expired")
if invite.used_count >= invite.max_uses:
raise InvalidInvite("invite has already been used")
if invite.email is not None and invite.email.lower() != email.lower():
raise InvalidInvite("invite is pinned to a different email address")
existing = (
await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email))
).scalar_one_or_none()
if existing is not None:
raise EmailAlreadyRegistered("an account with this email already exists")
user = User(
email=email,
display_name=display_name,
password_hash=hash_password(password),
role=invite.role,
)
db.add(user)
await db.flush() # populate user.id before we reference it below
invite.used_count += 1
return AuthenticatedSession(
user_id=user.id, email=user.email, display_name=user.display_name
)
async def login(
*, email: str, password: str, client: str, user_agent: str | None, ip: str | None
) -> tuple[str, AuthenticatedSession]:
"""Verify credentials and create a session. Returns (raw_token, session) — the raw token is
handed to the caller exactly once; only its hash is ever stored.
"""
async with auth_session() as db:
async with db.begin():
user = (await db.execute(select(User).where(User.email == email))).scalar_one_or_none()
# Deliberately identical error for "no such user" and "wrong password" — this is the
# one place a timing/response difference would leak which emails are registered.
if user is None or not user.is_active:
# Still run the hasher so this branch isn't measurably faster than a real
# mismatch (argon2's own duration masks a database-lookup-only shortcut).
verify_password(password, hash_password("decoy-password-never-matches"))
raise InvalidCredentials("invalid email or password")
if not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
raise InvalidCredentials("invalid email or password")
settings = get_settings()
raw_token, token_hash = generate_token()
session_row = Session(
user_id=user.id,
token_hash=token_hash,
client=client,
user_agent=user_agent,
ip=ip,
expires_at=datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(days=settings.session_ttl_days),
)
db.add(session_row)
return raw_token, AuthenticatedSession(
user_id=user.id, email=user.email, display_name=user.display_name
)
# Sessions are only touched this often to avoid a write on every single request; see
# docs/PLAN.md's auth section for the same throttling rule applied to last_seen_at.
_LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE = timedelta(minutes=5)
async def validate_session(raw_token: str) -> AuthenticatedSession:
"""Look a bearer token up and return the identity it belongs to, or raise SessionInvalid.
This is the auth entrypoint for every authenticated request — it's what runs *before*
db.scoped_session() can be used, because app.user_id isn't known until this returns.
"""
token_hash = hash_token(raw_token)
async with auth_session() as db:
async with db.begin():
row = (
await db.execute(
select(Session, User)
.join(User, User.id == Session.user_id)
.where(Session.token_hash == token_hash)
)
).one_or_none()
if row is None:
raise SessionInvalid("session not found")
session_row, user = row
if session_row.revoked_at is not None:
raise SessionInvalid("session has been revoked")
if session_row.expires_at < datetime.now(UTC):
raise SessionInvalid("session has expired")
if not user.is_active:
raise SessionInvalid("account is disabled")
now = datetime.now(UTC)
if now - session_row.last_seen_at > _LAST_SEEN_THROTTLE:
await db.execute(
update(Session).where(Session.id == session_row.id).values(last_seen_at=now)
)
return AuthenticatedSession(
user_id=user.id, email=user.email, display_name=user.display_name
)
async def logout(raw_token: str) -> None:
token_hash = hash_token(raw_token)
async with auth_session() as db:
async with db.begin():
await db.execute(
update(Session)
.where(Session.token_hash == token_hash, Session.revoked_at.is_(None))
.values(revoked_at=datetime.now(UTC))
)