BBergleandClaude Sonnet 5
5d4d76203f
Phase 0 deployment: three-service docker-compose.yml (caddy, api, db), a Caddyfile that proxies /api/* to the api service and serves the SPA with index.html fallback, and two Gitea Actions workflows (release.yml builds and pushes both images on a v* tag or manual dispatch; deploy.yml is manual-only and rolls them out to the Unraid host). The non-obvious part is the Docker-outside-of-Docker constraint on this act_runner setup: job containers share the host's Docker daemon over the socket but do NOT share its filesystem, so any command whose correctness depends on a client-side local path (docker cp to a host path, mv/rm -rf on a host path, a bind-mount source path on a `docker run` command line issued from inside a job) silently operates on the ephemeral job container's own throwaway filesystem instead. Two things are safe: a bind mount declared in a compose file's `volumes:` block (resolved by the daemon when `docker compose up` creates the service — this is why db's pgdata bind mount is fine), and a named volume populated by a one-shot `docker run` whose *command* does the copying (this is why the web image's static build output goes into a `web_build` named volume via `docker run -v ... sh -c 'cp -a ...'` in deploy.yml, rather than any `docker cp`). Local verification (see PR description for full detail) caught a real bug: `docker compose run api alembic upgrade head` needs VELODROME_DB_APP_PASSWORD/VELODROME_DB_AUTH_PASSWORD as container env vars to create the two runtime roles, but --env-file alone doesn't inject them since the api service's permanent environment block deliberately omits them (least-privilege — the long-running app should never need role-creation passwords). Fixed by passing them as explicit -e overrides on the migration step, same as VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
15 lines
380 B
Caddyfile
15 lines
380 B
Caddyfile
# Plain HTTP on :80 (mapped to host port 8090 by docker-compose.yml). No TLS here — the user's
|
|
# Nginx Proxy Manager instance is a separate concern and explicitly out of scope for Phase 0; this
|
|
# is reachable directly at http://192.168.0.103:8090.
|
|
:80 {
|
|
handle /api/* {
|
|
reverse_proxy api:8000
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
handle {
|
|
root * /srv/web
|
|
try_files {path} /index.html
|
|
file_server
|
|
}
|
|
}
|