Files
bike-app/apps/api/README.md
T
BBergleandClaude Opus 5 ddea750792
CI / Repo hygiene (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / Web (lint, typecheck, build) (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / Migrations reversible (pull_request) Successful in 12s
CI / API (lint, types, tests) (pull_request) Successful in 1m46s
feat(api): FastAPI skeleton with two-role RLS auth foundation
Phase 0's API half: a working FastAPI app with register/login/me/logout,
backed by a Postgres schema where row-level security is real and
independently proven, not just declared.

The core design decision, and the reason this lands as one PR instead of
several: request-scoped queries run as `velodrome_app` (NOBYPASSRLS), but
looking up identity in the first place — login by email, a session by its
token hash — has to happen *before* app.user_id can be set, so those specific
lookups run as a second role, `velodrome_auth` (BYPASSRLS), used nowhere else
in the codebase. See velodrome/db.py's module docstring and apps/api/README.md
for the full rationale. This is genuinely one reviewable unit: the migration,
the models, and the auth service only make sense evaluated together, since
they're three views of the same invariant.

tests/test_auth.py::test_rls_blocks_cross_user_session_reads is the test
worth reading first — it doesn't trust the RLS policy SQL because it reads
correctly, it proves isolation by registering two users and confirming a
scoped read of `sessions` for user A returns exactly one row, never two.

Bugs found and fixed while actually running this against real Postgres
(everything below was verified against a live postgis/postgis:16-3.4
container and a built Docker image, not just read for correctness):

- CREATE ROLE's PASSWORD clause is DDL, not DML — it doesn't accept bind
  parameters (`PASSWORD $1` is a syntax error). Fixed with dollar-quoting.
- Postgres roles are cluster-wide, not per-database — a second database in
  the same cluster hit "role already exists" on a plain CREATE ROLE. Fixed
  with a DO block catching duplicate_object.
- A bare `Mapped[datetime]` on the ORM models infers a naive timestamp,
  silently disagreeing with the migration's correct `DateTime(timezone=True)`
  — asyncpg rejected the mismatch at insert time. Fixed once, at the
  declarative Base level via type_annotation_map, rather than per-column.
- The session cookie's `secure` flag was gated on `!= "development"`, so
  anything else — including local testing and a real deploy running
  temporarily without TLS in front — got a Secure cookie no HTTP client
  will ever send back, breaking every authenticated request after login
  with no visible error. Gated on `== "production"` instead.
- `alembic check` initially flagged every PostGIS/TIGER-installed table
  (dozens of them) as drift, because they're not in our metadata. A
  schema-based denylist doesn't work — reflected foreign tables come back
  with schema=None regardless of their real schema. Fixed with an
  allowlist keyed on target_metadata.tables instead, which is also more
  robust against future PostGIS versions adding more tables.
- The migration itself was missing `nullable=False` on three timestamp
  columns that the ORM model assumed were never null — a genuine
  model/migration drift that alembic check caught once the PostGIS noise
  above was filtered out. Fixed in 0001 directly, since it's never shipped.
- Two indexes the migration creates explicitly weren't declared on the
  ORM models, causing the same kind of drift. Added index=True to match.

Deliberately deferred, not forgotten: per-IP/per-account login rate
limiting (docs/PLAN.md mentions it; Phase 0's bar is a working skeleton,
and this needs its own design pass) and the procrastinate job runner /
worker container (nothing to run yet — arrives with the ingestion
pipeline).

ci.yml updated to match: the api and migrations jobs now provision the
same two runtime roles this code actually needs, replacing the single
placeholder DATABASE_URL from before any code existed.

Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy --strict all clean.
12/12 pytest passing against a real Postgres. Full alembic upgrade ->
downgrade -1 -> upgrade cycle run twice (once standalone, once inside a
two-database cluster to specifically catch the role-collision bug).
alembic check clean. Docker image builds and serves real traffic —
register and an authenticated GET /me both exercised against the actual
built container, not just the test suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-21 08:14:06 -04:00

5.2 KiB

apps/api

Python 3.12 / FastAPI / SQLAlchemy 2.0 async / Alembic. See docs/PLAN.md for the overall design and docs/DECISIONS.md for why things are built this way.

Layout

velodrome/
  app.py              FastAPI app factory
  config.py            Settings (env-driven, see below)
  db.py                Two database engines — read this first, it's the load-bearing module
  ids.py                UUIDv7 generation
  models/               SQLAlchemy models
  auth/                 Password hashing, session service, FastAPI auth dependencies
  api/v1/                Route handlers
  schemas/               Pydantic request/response models
alembic/                 Migrations. 0001_baseline.py creates the identity tables, the two
                          runtime DB roles, and their RLS policies — read its module docstring.
tests/                    pytest, against a real Postgres, never mocked

Why two database connections

The app connects to Postgres as two different roles, not one — this is the single most important thing to understand before touching auth/ or db.py:

  • velodrome_appNOBYPASSRLS. Every request that already knows who's calling uses this, via db.scoped_session(user_id), which sets app.user_id for the transaction so Postgres RLS policies can key off it.
  • velodrome_authBYPASSRLS. Used only by auth/service.py, and only for the narrow set of lookups that must happen before identity is known: login by email, a session by its token hash, an invite by its code hash — plus the inserts that create those rows. Every one of those queries is an exact match on a unique key, never an unfiltered scan, which is what makes bypassing RLS safe there.

A third connection — VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE — is used only by Alembic. It needs enough privilege to CREATE ROLE and GRANT, so in practice it's the Postgres superuser (or a schema-owning role); the app itself never connects with it.

If you're adding a new table with per-user data: give it a user_id column, enable RLS on it in a migration, and query it only through scoped_session. See CLAUDE.md's invariants.

Environment variables

Variable Used by Notes
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE Alembic only Superuser/owner DSN. Never used by the app itself.
VELODROME_DB_APP_PASSWORD Alembic (creates the role) No default — the migration fails loudly if unset.
VELODROME_DB_AUTH_PASSWORD Alembic (creates the role) Same.
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_APP The app Connects as velodrome_app.
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_AUTH The app Connects as velodrome_auth.
VELODROME_SECRET_KEY The app Not yet used (arrives with the Bryton credential encryption in a later phase); declared now so the settings shape is stable.
VELODROME_ENVIRONMENT The app development / test / production. Gates the session cookie's Secure flag — see the comment in api/v1/auth.py before changing this condition.
VELODROME_PUBLIC_URL The app Used for the CSRF Origin check on cookie-authenticated mutations.

Running locally

uv sync --all-extras

# a throwaway Postgres
docker run -d --name velodrome-dev-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=velodrome \
  -p 5432:5432 postgis/postgis:16-3.4

export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_MIGRATE=postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/velodrome
export VELODROME_DB_APP_PASSWORD=devpassword1
export VELODROME_DB_AUTH_PASSWORD=devpassword2
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_APP=postgresql+asyncpg://velodrome_app:devpassword1@localhost:5432/velodrome
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL_AUTH=postgresql+asyncpg://velodrome_auth:devpassword2@localhost:5432/velodrome

uv run alembic upgrade head
uv run uvicorn velodrome.app:app --reload

GET /api/v1/healthz should return {"status": "ok"}; GET /api/v1/docs has interactive Swagger UI outside production.

Testing

uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy --strict velodrome
uv run pytest

Tests run against a real Postgres (a service container in CI, or point tests/conftest.py's defaults at your own) — never mocks for DB behaviour, per CLAUDE.md. The test suite runs the real Alembic migration at session start, not a parallel schema-creation shortcut, so it's exercising the exact same path a real deploy uses.

The test worth reading if you're new to this codebase is tests/test_auth.py::test_rls_blocks_cross_user_session_reads — it doesn't trust that the RLS policy SQL is correct because it reads correctly; it proves it by actually trying to read another user's row through the scoped role and asserting zero come back.

A note on alembic check

CI's migrations job runs alembic check to catch drift between the ORM models and the actual migrations. alembic/env.py's include_object filter restricts that comparison to tables our own metadata declares — deliberately an allowlist, not a denylist of PostGIS/TIGER tables, because reflected foreign tables can come back with schema=None regardless of which schema they actually live in (confirmed against a real postgis/postgis:16-3.4 container), which makes a schema-based denylist unreliable. If you add a new model, it's automatically covered — no filter to update.