Phase 0's API half: a working FastAPI app with register/login/me/logout, backed by a Postgres schema where row-level security is real and independently proven, not just declared. The core design decision, and the reason this lands as one PR instead of several: request-scoped queries run as `velodrome_app` (NOBYPASSRLS), but looking up identity in the first place — login by email, a session by its token hash — has to happen *before* app.user_id can be set, so those specific lookups run as a second role, `velodrome_auth` (BYPASSRLS), used nowhere else in the codebase. See velodrome/db.py's module docstring and apps/api/README.md for the full rationale. This is genuinely one reviewable unit: the migration, the models, and the auth service only make sense evaluated together, since they're three views of the same invariant. tests/test_auth.py::test_rls_blocks_cross_user_session_reads is the test worth reading first — it doesn't trust the RLS policy SQL because it reads correctly, it proves isolation by registering two users and confirming a scoped read of `sessions` for user A returns exactly one row, never two. Bugs found and fixed while actually running this against real Postgres (everything below was verified against a live postgis/postgis:16-3.4 container and a built Docker image, not just read for correctness): - CREATE ROLE's PASSWORD clause is DDL, not DML — it doesn't accept bind parameters (`PASSWORD $1` is a syntax error). Fixed with dollar-quoting. - Postgres roles are cluster-wide, not per-database — a second database in the same cluster hit "role already exists" on a plain CREATE ROLE. Fixed with a DO block catching duplicate_object. - A bare `Mapped[datetime]` on the ORM models infers a naive timestamp, silently disagreeing with the migration's correct `DateTime(timezone=True)` — asyncpg rejected the mismatch at insert time. Fixed once, at the declarative Base level via type_annotation_map, rather than per-column. - The session cookie's `secure` flag was gated on `!= "development"`, so anything else — including local testing and a real deploy running temporarily without TLS in front — got a Secure cookie no HTTP client will ever send back, breaking every authenticated request after login with no visible error. Gated on `== "production"` instead. - `alembic check` initially flagged every PostGIS/TIGER-installed table (dozens of them) as drift, because they're not in our metadata. A schema-based denylist doesn't work — reflected foreign tables come back with schema=None regardless of their real schema. Fixed with an allowlist keyed on target_metadata.tables instead, which is also more robust against future PostGIS versions adding more tables. - The migration itself was missing `nullable=False` on three timestamp columns that the ORM model assumed were never null — a genuine model/migration drift that alembic check caught once the PostGIS noise above was filtered out. Fixed in 0001 directly, since it's never shipped. - Two indexes the migration creates explicitly weren't declared on the ORM models, causing the same kind of drift. Added index=True to match. Deliberately deferred, not forgotten: per-IP/per-account login rate limiting (docs/PLAN.md mentions it; Phase 0's bar is a working skeleton, and this needs its own design pass) and the procrastinate job runner / worker container (nothing to run yet — arrives with the ingestion pipeline). ci.yml updated to match: the api and migrations jobs now provision the same two runtime roles this code actually needs, replacing the single placeholder DATABASE_URL from before any code existed. Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, and mypy --strict all clean. 12/12 pytest passing against a real Postgres. Full alembic upgrade -> downgrade -1 -> upgrade cycle run twice (once standalone, once inside a two-database cluster to specifically catch the role-collision bug). alembic check clean. Docker image builds and serves real traffic — register and an authenticated GET /me both exercised against the actual built container, not just the test suite. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
114 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
114 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Two database engines, on purpose.
|
|
|
|
`app` engine: connects as a role with RLS enforced (NOBYPASSRLS). Every request handler that has
|
|
already established who the caller is uses this, wrapped in `scoped_session()` below, which sets
|
|
`app.user_id` for the transaction so RLS policies can key off it.
|
|
|
|
`auth` engine: connects as a role with BYPASSRLS. Used ONLY by velodrome.auth.service, and only
|
|
for the narrow set of queries that must run *before* identity is known — looking a user up by
|
|
email at login, a session up by its hashed token, an invite up by its hashed code — plus the
|
|
inserts that create those rows in the first place. Nothing outside auth/service.py should import
|
|
this engine; if you find yourself reaching for it elsewhere, the query almost certainly belongs
|
|
in a repository method on the scoped session instead (see CLAUDE.md invariant #4).
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
|
|
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
|
|
from uuid import UUID
|
|
|
|
from sqlalchemy import text
|
|
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import (
|
|
AsyncEngine,
|
|
AsyncSession,
|
|
async_sessionmaker,
|
|
create_async_engine,
|
|
)
|
|
from sqlalchemy.pool import NullPool
|
|
|
|
from velodrome.config import get_settings
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _make_engine(url: str) -> AsyncEngine:
|
|
settings = get_settings()
|
|
# NullPool in dev/test keeps behaviour predictable across the pytest-asyncio event loop;
|
|
# production tuning (pool_size etc.) is a deploy-time concern, not a Phase-0 one.
|
|
return create_async_engine(
|
|
url,
|
|
poolclass=NullPool if settings.environment == "test" else None,
|
|
echo=False,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
_app_engine: AsyncEngine | None = None
|
|
_auth_engine: AsyncEngine | None = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def app_engine() -> AsyncEngine:
|
|
global _app_engine
|
|
if _app_engine is None:
|
|
_app_engine = _make_engine(str(get_settings().database_url_app))
|
|
return _app_engine
|
|
|
|
|
|
def auth_engine() -> AsyncEngine:
|
|
global _auth_engine
|
|
if _auth_engine is None:
|
|
_auth_engine = _make_engine(str(get_settings().database_url_auth))
|
|
return _auth_engine
|
|
|
|
|
|
_app_sessionmaker: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession] | None = None
|
|
_auth_sessionmaker: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession] | None = None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _app_sessions() -> async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]:
|
|
global _app_sessionmaker
|
|
if _app_sessionmaker is None:
|
|
_app_sessionmaker = async_sessionmaker(app_engine(), expire_on_commit=False)
|
|
return _app_sessionmaker
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _auth_sessions() -> async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]:
|
|
global _auth_sessionmaker
|
|
if _auth_sessionmaker is None:
|
|
_auth_sessionmaker = async_sessionmaker(auth_engine(), expire_on_commit=False)
|
|
return _auth_sessionmaker
|
|
|
|
|
|
@asynccontextmanager
|
|
async def auth_session() -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
|
|
"""A BYPASSRLS session. See module docstring — auth/service.py only."""
|
|
async with _auth_sessions()() as session:
|
|
yield session
|
|
|
|
|
|
@asynccontextmanager
|
|
async def scoped_session(user_id: UUID) -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
|
|
"""An RLS-scoped session for a known, authenticated user.
|
|
|
|
`SET LOCAL` binds to the current transaction, not the connection, so this is safe under
|
|
connection pooling — it can never leak `app.user_id` from one request into a pooled
|
|
connection reused by a different request.
|
|
"""
|
|
async with _app_sessions()() as session:
|
|
async with session.begin():
|
|
await session.execute(
|
|
# bound parameter, not string interpolation — user_id is a UUID we generated
|
|
# or validated ourselves, but there is no reason to ever risk it.
|
|
text("SELECT set_config('app.user_id', :uid, true)"),
|
|
{"uid": str(user_id)},
|
|
)
|
|
yield session
|
|
|
|
|
|
@asynccontextmanager
|
|
async def unscoped_session() -> AsyncIterator[AsyncSession]:
|
|
"""An `app`-role session with no `app.user_id` set.
|
|
|
|
RLS policies default-deny when `current_setting('app.user_id', true)` is NULL, so this sees
|
|
zero rows of any user-owned table — useful for health checks and anything that only touches
|
|
non-RLS tables. Prefer `scoped_session` whenever a user is known.
|
|
"""
|
|
async with _app_sessions()() as session:
|
|
yield session
|