A fresh deployment could not be used. Registration requires a valid invite
code, invites can only be issued by an existing admin, and a newly migrated
database has neither -- so there was no way to create the first account.
docs/PLAN.md always called for this command; it was never built during
Phase 0, and D16 (single-container deploy) made the gap reachable.
Adds a console script -- `[project.scripts]` -> velodrome.cli:main -- which
installs into the same venv as alembic and uvicorn, so the deployed image
already has it on PATH:
docker exec -it velodrome velodrome create-admin --email you@example.com
The account-creating logic is `auth.service.create_admin`, not something in
cli.py, so that `db.auth_session` stays confined to auth/service.py as its
docstring requires. Its lookup is an exact match on a unique key, which is
the pattern db.py documents as safe on that session.
Deliberate constraints, all covered by tests (see docs/DECISIONS.md D18):
- Refuses an email that already exists rather than updating the row. An
operator re-running a months-old command from shell history means "create",
never "reset the password"; silently accepting would make this an
undocumented password-reset tool that any container-exec grants.
- Not restricted to "only when there are zero users". The restriction buys
nothing -- reaching the command already requires process execution inside
the container, which already permits rewriting the SQLite file directly --
while removing the cases that do happen: a second admin, and recovering an
instance whose only admin was lost.
- No --password flag. An argument lands in shell history, in ps output, and
in the Docker daemon's record of the exec'd command. A TTY prompt (with
confirmation) and --password-stdin are the two forms that avoid all three.
- Pydantic's ValidationError is never printed verbatim: its rendering embeds
the offending value, which for a short password prints the password itself.
Only loc and msg are shown (CLAUDE.md invariant #5).
role="admin" is recorded but nothing enforces it yet -- there is no
admin-only endpoint until invite management in Phase 1. ROLE_ADMIN/
ROLE_MEMBER become named constants, and AuthenticatedSession carries the
role for that future check. It is deliberately absent from UserOut, so no
HTTP response and no OpenAPI contract changes. The register endpoint's
password and display-name constraints move to named aliases in schemas/auth
so the CLI applies exactly the same rules rather than a drifting copy.
Verified: ruff check, ruff format --check, mypy --strict, and the full
pytest suite (28 passed) from apps/api/; `alembic check` reports no model
drift. Also smoke-tested end to end against a scratch database -- creation,
the duplicate-email refusal, and the no-TTY message all behave as described.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R2ZKeWkZV7ehf7fivrAkkG
apps/api
Python 3.12 / FastAPI / SQLAlchemy 2.0 async / Alembic / SQLite. See docs/PLAN.md for the
overall design and docs/DECISIONS.md (D15 especially) for why the database is SQLite and not
the Postgres+PostGIS setup Phase 0 originally shipped with.
Layout
velodrome/
app.py FastAPI app factory
config.py Settings (env-driven, see below)
db.py Single engine + the repository-layer scope — read this first, it's the
load-bearing module for user isolation now that there's no RLS
ids.py UUIDv7 generation
models/ SQLAlchemy models
auth/ Password hashing, session service, FastAPI auth dependencies
api/v1/ Route handlers
schemas/ Pydantic request/response models
alembic/ Migrations. 0001_baseline.py creates the identity tables — no roles, no
RLS, no GRANTs, none of those concepts exist in SQLite.
tests/ pytest, against a real SQLite file, never mocked
Why isolation is enforced in Python now, not the database
Phase 0 originally ran two Postgres roles (velodrome_app/velodrome_auth) with row-level
security as a database-enforced isolation layer. SQLite has no roles, no session variables, and no
policy engine — there is no database-level backstop anymore. This is the single most important
thing to understand before touching auth/ or db.py:
scoped_session(user_id)— for every query against a user-owned table once identity is known. Yields aScope, whoseselect()is the only way to build a query through it, and every query it builds is pre-filtered to thatuser_idon any model that declares one. There is no method onScopethat returns an unfiltered query — seetests/test_auth.py'stest_scope_select_rejects_models_without_user_idfor what happens if you try it on a model that isn't user-owned (Invite, scoped bycreated_byrather thanuser_id, is the real example used there).auth_session()— used only byauth/service.py, for the narrow set of lookups that must happen before identity is known: login by email, a session by its token hash, an invite by its code hash, plus the inserts that create those rows. Every one of those queries is an exact match on a unique key, never an unfiltered scan — that discipline is what makes it safe to use a plain session here instead ofScope.unscoped_session()— a plain session with no scoping applied at all, for health checks and anything that never touches a user-owned table.tests/test_auth.py'stest_unscoped_session_can_see_every_user_when_misuseddemonstrates, deliberately, what happens if this gets used on a user-owned table instead ofscoped_session— it sees everyone's rows. That test exists to make the point vivid: reaching forunscoped_session()(or a rawauth_session()query) against a user-owned table is a review-blocking mistake now, not a style preference, because there's nothing else standing behind it.
If you're adding a new table with per-user data: give it a user_id column and query it only
through scoped_session. See CLAUDE.md's invariant #4.
Two SQLite behaviours that don't match the defaults you'd expect
Both confirmed empirically against real aiosqlite, not assumed from docs — see db.py's
_configure_sqlite_for_concurrent_writers for the fixes:
- Foreign keys,
ON DELETE CASCADEincluded, are OFF by default per connection. WithoutPRAGMA foreign_keys=ON, deleting a user silently leaves its sessions/api_tokens behind instead of cascading — no error either way. - Transactions default to DEFERRED, which only takes a write lock on the first actual write —
leaving a real check-then-act race window (e.g. two concurrent redemptions of the same invite
code both reading
used_count < max_usesas true before either commits). Every transaction on this engine issuesBEGIN IMMEDIATEinstead, which takes the write lock up front. One consequence worth knowing if you're writing tests: a session that autobegins a transaction via a bare read and never explicitly commits/rolls back holds that write lock until the session closes — see the comment aboveawait db_auth.commit()intest_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_readsfor a real example of this biting a long-lived test fixture.
Also worth knowing: Uuid(as_uuid=True) stores as 32-char hex with no hyphens on SQLite, not
str(uuid)'s hyphenated form. This only matters if you ever write a UUID into this schema via raw
SQL instead of the ORM (as the test fixtures do, to set up state without going through the API) —
use .hex, not str(), or the ORM's own later queries against that row won't match it. See the
docstring on _seed_invite in tests/test_auth.py for the failure this caused when it was
gotten wrong.
Environment variables
| Variable | Used by | Notes |
|---|---|---|
VELODROME_DATABASE_URL |
The app and Alembic, both | e.g. sqlite+aiosqlite:////data/velodrome.db. One DSN — there's no separate migration role anymore since SQLite has no roles to separate. |
VELODROME_SECRET_KEY |
The app | Not yet used (arrives with the Bryton credential encryption in a later phase); declared now so the settings shape is stable. |
VELODROME_ENVIRONMENT |
The app | development / test / production. Gates the session cookie's Secure flag — see the comment in api/v1/auth.py before changing this condition. |
VELODROME_PUBLIC_URL |
The app | Used for the CSRF Origin check on cookie-authenticated mutations. |
Running locally
uv sync --all-extras
export VELODROME_DATABASE_URL=sqlite+aiosqlite:///./velodrome-dev.db
uv run alembic upgrade head
uv run uvicorn velodrome.app:app --reload
GET /api/v1/healthz should return {"status": "ok"}; GET /api/v1/docs has interactive
Swagger UI outside production.
Testing
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy --strict velodrome
uv run pytest
Tests run against a real SQLite file in a temp directory (never :memory:, which gives each
separate connection its own isolated database rather than one shared one, and never mocks for DB
behaviour, per CLAUDE.md). The suite runs the real Alembic migration at session start, not a
parallel schema-creation shortcut, so it's exercising the exact same path a real deploy uses.
The test worth reading first if you're new to this codebase is
tests/test_auth.py::test_scoped_session_blocks_cross_user_reads — it doesn't trust that
Scope.select() filters correctly because the code reads correctly; it proves it by registering
two real users and confirming a scoped read for one never returns the other's row, even though
both exist in the same table.
A note on alembic check
CI's migrations job runs alembic check to catch drift between the ORM models and the actual
migrations. There's no include_object filter in alembic/env.py anymore — Phase 0's version
needed one to exclude PostGIS/TIGER's own pre-installed tables from the comparison, but SQLite
starts with nothing but what this app's own migrations create, so there's no foreign-table noise
to filter out in the first place.